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Marine Casualty
Investigations

Enquêtes sur les
accidents maritimes

FISHING VESSELS

**Summaries of Reports of
Investigations into Marine
Casualties and Accidents
Aboard Ships**

Issue No. 11

August 1990

Summaries of Fishing Vessel Marine Casualties and Accidents

This publication summarizes the Reports of Investigation into marine casualties and/or marine accidents involving fishing vessels which were investigated by the Marine Casualty Investigations Division of Transport Canada and is published three times a year. There is another publication covering commercial vessels and other craft.

Note:

1. A glossary of terms and abbreviations used can be found at the end of this publication.
2. Unless stated otherwise, all times mentioned in this publication are local times.
3. Unless stated otherwise, all Regulations referred to in this publication are made pursuant to the Canada Shipping Act.

The full report of the summaries contained herein may be obtained by writing to:

Director
Canadian Transportation Accident
Investigation and Safety Board
Investigations - Marine
P.O. Box 9120
Alta Vista Terminal
OTTAWA, ONTARIO
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Readers are reminded that this publication and the Reports of Investigation issued by the Marine Casualty Investigations Division are released for accident prevention purposes only and are confined to cause-related circumstances.

Their contents may be deficient and misleading if used in any other process and are not to be used or admitted in evidence in any legal proceedings, either civil or criminal, arising out of any casualty described therein. The statements, opinions and findings in the reports and summaries are those of the Marine Casualty Investigations Division only and do not constitute admissions made by or on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen in right of Canada.

Effective March 29, 1990, the mandate to conduct investigations into Marine occurrences was transferred to the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board (CTAISB) - Investigations Marine. In accordance with the Act establishing this new organization, outstanding investigations conducted under the Canada Shipping Act prior to this date are being completed and distributed by CTAISB - Investigations Marine.

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"PACIFIC LAUREL"



"PACIFIC LAUREL"

Grounding on Sophia Island, B.C., March 27, 1989.

Summary


The 135 gross ton, 33.04 m packer "PACIFIC LAUREL" is a Canadian seiner, currently used as a herring and salmon packer and on this occasion she was utilized for carrying fresh water. Included in her navigation equipment were 2 radars, a Loran C, an echo sounder, 2 VHF R/Ts, an auto-pilot and a magnetic compass. She departed Namu, B.C., March 27, 1989, with a cargo of 110 t of fresh water and a crew of 3, bound for Vancouver, B.C. At about 1600, the second radar became unserviceable; the first radar having been unserviceable since March 21, prior to the vessel's departure from Vancouver for Namu. Following the mate taking over the watch at 1800, consideration was given by the master to call at Alert Bay for repairs but this was discounted as weather conditions were good. During the watch, based on the OOW's preference, the vessel's steering was switched from auto-pilot to hand steering. The OOW, alone in the wheel-house was performing the duties of a navigator, a helmsman and a look-out.

The vessel was heading on a course of 090°(M) at a speed of about 9 knots. At 2237, without positively identifying the light and without first ascertaining the vessel's position, the OOW mistook the Cracroft Point light to be the Boat Bay light and altered course to 073°(M). No soundings were possible as the echo sounder was not functioning. Shortly thereafter, the OOW felt that the vessel was too close to shore. He directed a searchlight ahead and upon sighting a submerged ledge he applied full starboard helm but the vessel struck a glancing blow sustaining bottom damage, and disabling the port engine and port rudder.

The master, awakened by the impact, entered the wheel-house, and throttled down both motors and had the vessel inspected for damage. After surveying the damage, the fresh water cargo from the after fish tank was pumped overboard, the vessel returned to an even keel, and the ingress of water kept under control with one pump. He used VHF R/T channel 16 to broadcast an 'urgency' message seeking assistance thus initiating an official SAR response. The vessel was eventually towed to Alert Bay and following temporary repairs, she proceeded to New Westminster, B.C. on April 3 for permanent repairs which were estimated to cost \$90,000.

Findings

While transiting Johnstone Strait at night in good visibility and weather conditions, the fishing vessel/packer "PACIFIC LAUREL" grounded on Sophia Island, B.C. on March 27, 1989 due to error in navigation.



HARBLEDOWN ISLAND

BARONET PASSAGE

WEST CRACROFT ISLAND

Grounding position
Position de l'échouement

Actual alter course position
Position exacte du changement de cap

JOHNSTON STRAIT
Sillage proposé
073°M
090°(M)
Proposed track

Intended alter course position
Position projetée du changement de cap

"PACIFIC LAUREL"
SECTION RÉDUITE DE LA CARTE NO. 3546 DU SHC
REDUCED SECTION OF CHS CHART NO. 3546
PROFONDEURS EN MÈTRES
DEPTHS IN METRES

NOTE - All positions and tracks are approximate
NOTA - Toutes les positions et les sillages sont approximatifs

It would appear that the following factors contributed to the grounding:

- when the second radar became unserviceable, there was no other navigation equipment available to the OOW to aid him in the navigation of the vessel;
- neither the vessel's progress was plotted on the chart in use nor was her position established prior to course alteration;
- the Cracroft Point light was mistaken for the Boat Bay light and the wrong alteration of course made;
- based on his preference, the OOW switched over the steering from auto-pilot to hand steering;
- being preoccupied with steering and look-out duties, the OOW was unable to give his undivided attention to the safe navigation of the vessel; and
- verification of the vessel's progress using steaming time between passing of known landmarks was not carried out.

Other Findings

The vessel did not carry up-to-date charts and publications for the area.

The echo sounder on board was not connected up and operational.

Although voluntarily equipped with radar sets, when the second radar failed, the opportunity to have both radars examined at Alert Bay was not taken.

"SONNY C.2"

Loss overboard and death of a crew member, Plaisance Bay, May 27, 1989.

Summary

The "SONNY C.2" is a small 7 gross ton fishing vessel typical of the ones used to fish for lobster or bait in Magdalen Islands. The accommodation and wheel-house are located aft, the machinery space amidship. Half-way between the top of the bulwark and the vessel's bottom is a deck at the after end of the vessel; the height of the bulwark being 407 mm.

On May 27, 1989, the vessel departed Cap-aux-Meules wharf in Magdalen Islands to retrieve some lobster traps and haul in the previously laid mackerel nets in Plaisance Bay.

After the catch had been retrieved and while the vessel was underway, a crew member, who was working on deck and was seated on a box on the port side facing inboard, fell overboard; no cry for help was heard. The skipper, upon being informed of the man-overboard situation by a co-worker, immediately swung the vessel around and headed towards the victim who was floating motionless with his face in the water. Within 5 minutes of his fall overboard and with great difficulty, the victim was hauled aboard and placed on deck in an unconscious state.

Whilst enroute to port, an ambulance was requested and attempts were made to revive the victim but he never gained consciousness. Upon arrival at Cap-aux-Meules, the victim was transferred to the waiting ambulance and, within half an hour after his fall, he was at the hospital where, following examination, he was pronounced dead.

The victim had not complained about being sick before he fell overboard and he suffered from no known illness.

Findings

On May 27, 1989, whilst the vessel was underway, the deck-hand aboard the small fishing vessel "SONNY C.2", who was working on the deck, fell overboard and drowned.

It would appear that the following factors contributed to the accident:

- the victim, while seated on a box on the port side of the vessel and facing inboard, fell overboard without shouting for help;
- the victim may have lost his balance due to the light rolling caused by slight seas and fell overboard;

"SONNY C.2"




3 days after the accident. 3 jours après l'accident.



The victim was sitting on the 2 boxes on the port side when he fell overboard.

La victime était assise sur les deux boîtes à bâbord lorsqu'elle a basculé pas dessus bord.

- the bulwark was only 407 cm high;
- the victim hit his forehead either during or after his fall and was rendered unconscious;
- the victim was not wearing any lifejacket or PFD; and
- the victim did not regain consciousness, despite the attempts to revive him.



APPROXIMATE POSITION OF ACCIDENT
POSITION APPROXIMATIVE DE L'ACCIDENT

"SONNY C.2"

SECTION DE LA CARTE
NO. L/C 4451 DU SHC

PROFONDEURS EN
BRASSES

SECTION OF CHS CHART
NO. L/C 4451

DEPTHS IN FATHOMS

"GORDON BOLT NO 3"

Flooding with loss of life, south shore of Anticosti
Island, July 29, 1989.

Summary

The 2 gross ton, 6.7 m wooden lobster fishing boat "GORDON BOLT NO 3", locally known as the "DÉBROUILLARD", was engaged in lobster fishing off the south shore of Anticosti Island. The vessel used the Lac-de-la-Croix encampment located some 7 miles east of Pointe-du-Sud as the base for its operation. On or about July 25, 1989, because of bad weather forecast, the traps were moved into deep water some 1.5 miles offshore.

At dawn on July 29, in light of the favourable weather forecasts, the "DÉBROUILLARD", in company with the "EMMANUEL", set out from the Lac-de-la-Croix encampment to return the traps to shallow waters.

At about 1430, the "DÉBROUILLARD" was setting a line of eight traps, attached to a 3/8 inch nylon rope approximately 18 m long, inside the 5-fathom contour when the rope wound round the propeller. The motor abruptly seized and the boat, now effectively "anchored" by the stern, swung to starboard. The skipper tried in vain to grab and cut the rope fouling the propeller. During that time, the boat, with the wind and wave astern, shipped water and began to settle. Unable to cut the rope, the two fishermen removed their rubber boots and the skipper placed a lifebuoy around him, and the deck-hand donned a lifejacket. When the boat was submerged in about one foot of water, they took the precaution of tying themselves together and abandoned the vessel.

As the skipper was the only swimmer, the deck-hand held onto the skipper's lifebuoy and the latter endeavored to swim to shore. The strong ebb current made swimming difficult. When they eventually reached the shore, the skipper was exhausted, disoriented and confused and asked the deck-hand where land was. The deck-hand, also exhausted and suffering from hypothermia, dragged the skipper along with difficulty and hauled him onto a large rock. After removing the lifebuoy from around the skipper's body at the latter's request, the deck-hand hurried to the encampment some 3 to 4 miles away to get help.

Upon returning to the scene, there was no sign of the skipper on the rock as both were covered with water by the rising tide. Following a search, the skipper's body was recovered the following day some 2 miles from shore.

Findings


On the afternoon on July 29, 1989 whilst the lobster boat "DÉBROUILLARD" was placing lobster traps on the seabed in the

Shore Rivage

Direction of wind, Direction du vent, du
current and waves courant et des vagues



"GORDON BOLT NO 3"



Traps were placed over the starboard side in the water

Mise à l'eau des casiers du côté tribord

1) Line entangled in propeller

Filin enroulé autour de l'hélice

2) Boat swings to starboard

L'embarcation pivote à tribord

3) Stern to wind and waves, shipped water over the stern and sank

L'arrière au vent et à la mer, l'eau embarque sur l'arrière et l'embarcation coule

vicinity south of Anticosti Island, the rope attached to a string of lobster traps became entangled in her propeller resulting in loss of propulsion and steerageway.

Effectively anchored by the stern by the lobster line and as she lay beam to the westerly swell/waves, the small boat rapidly flooded and sank.

It would appear that the following factors contributed to the sinking:

- setting the lobster traps from the leeward side caused the fouling of the propeller;
- the rapid swamping of the boat precluded the use of the manual pump;
- attempts by the owner to cut the lobster line were unsuccessful.

After pulling the deck-hand to safety whilst swimming ashore, the operator lost his life due to the following contributing factors:

- the 6°C water temperature limited the victim's survival time to about an hour;
- the loss of body heat due to the swimming resulted in the victim succumbing to hypothermia;
- the victim was lost and confused by the time he reached the shore due to overexhaustion; and
- the victim, left unattended on a rock, was covered by the rising tide.

Other Findings

The deck-hand survived because of the operator's determination to swim ashore.

The deck-hand was a non-swimmer.

The presence of other fishing vessels in the general area was fortuitous in that problems arising from poor VHF coverage of the specific area was overcome by relaying of the radio messages.

It would appear that in the area of the accident, VHF radio communications with CGRS Rivière-au-Renard is sometimes difficult due to the difficulties encountered by the VHF tower in picking up radio signals.


"GORDON BOLT NO 3"

Section réduite de la Reduced section of CHS
carte N° L/C 4001 du SHC chart No L/C 4001


É B E C

Profondeurs en mètres Depths in metres


AR INTERPOLATOR
EUR LINÉAIRE LORAN



"JASON WADE"



Under repair after salvaging.
En réparation après avoir été récupéré.



Unplugged scupper holes. Dalots non bouchés.

"JASON WAYDE"

**Capsize, sinking and subsequent salvage off West Coast
of Prince Edward Island, August 9, 1989.**

Summary

The 11.9 gross ton, 10.94 m small Canadian fishing vessel of open construction "JASON WAYDE" was loaded with 108 wooden lobster traps and their associated gear, all stowed but not secured on the well deck. The vessel was trimmed by the stern such that her scupper holes at the sides and at the transom were submerged by some 30 mm and 60 mm respectively requiring them to be plugged; the effective freeboard astern was some 480 mm.

The vessel, with a crew of 5, departed Howard's Cove, P.E.I., at the start of the lobster fishing season during the morning of August 9, 1989 bound for the lobster fishing grounds offshore. The weather at departure and to the time of capsizing some 10 minutes later was winds west-north-west at 23 knots generating moderate to rough north-westerly seas outside of the harbour. After passing the entrance to the harbour, she encountered the first of a series of waves from ahead while proceeding at a speed of some 8 knots. The waves, some 2 m high, caused the "JASON WAYDE" to pitch heavily and to ship water over the bow and wheel-house onto the well deck. The vessel trimmed further by the stern and listed heavily and rapidly to starboard until the freeboard had become so reduced that subsequent seas further swamped the well deck. The vessel listed further to starboard while seawater flowed over the starboard gunwale and downflooded into the accommodation, causing the vessel to sink, stern first, in position 46°44.2'W, 64°24.8'W and while listed to an angle of some 90°.

The speed at which the vessel capsized and sank, estimated at 2 minutes, precluded the crew from donning lifejackets or launching the inflatable liferaft or transmitting a "MAYDAY" message. Meanwhile, the crew abandoned the vessel and jumped into the sea. Fortunately, another fishing vessel enroute to the fishing grounds observed the sinking and rescued the crew.

A week later, the "JASON WAYDE" was salvaged and repaired at an estimated cost of \$6,000. Minimal pollution was reported.

This casualty is typical of a series of similar sinkings involving this class of vessel, whereby waves shipped on board are unable to drain off; already heavily laden, the vessels are overwhelmed. There are many such vessels at risk. This casualty once again emphasises the need for operators to exercise due caution in the loading of their vessels.

"JASON WAYDE"

SECTION DE LA CARTE
NO. 4023 DU SHC

SECTION OF CHS CHART
NO. 4023

PROFONDEURS EN
BRASSES

DEPTHS IN FATHOMS

POSITION OF SINKING
POSITION DU NAUFRAGE

HOWARD'S COVE
ANSE HOWARD



Findings

The Canadian fishing vessel "JASON WAYDE" sank in relatively rough sea conditions while enroute to fishing grounds off the West Coast of Prince Edward Island on August 9, 1989 and while heavily laden with lobster traps and fishing gear.

It would appear that the contributing factors were:

- this small vessel of open construction was heavily laden for the sea conditions encountered;
- the vessel was loaded to the extent that the freeboard was considerably reduced and the well deck scupper holes were submerged requiring them to be plugged;
- seawater entered the undrained well deck and became entrapped, causing a free surface effect which drastically reduced the vessel's initial transverse stability; and
- the entrapped seawater gravitated to one side of the well deck causing the vessel to list and submerge her gunwale, allowing additional water onto the deck which then downflooded to the lower hull section producing a total loss of buoyancy.


Other Findings

The speed of capsize and sinking precluded the use of the life-saving equipment and radiotelephone.

The proximity of another fishing vessel close astern was fortunate.

The inflatable liferaft painter was not secured as recommended.

"BERING SEA"



Hydraulically operated winch drum.
Tambour de treuil hydraulique.

"BERING SEA"

Injury to a crew member, off Bonilla, B.C., August 14, 1989.

Summary

The 110 gross ton, 21.15 m "BERING SEA" is a typical west coast seiner/longliner of closed, welded steel construction. She was equipped with a hydraulically powered steel drop stern, drum winch and pursing winch. The operating controls on the drum winch are not of the 'dead-man' type; the controls aboard the "BERING SEA" were positive on/off or neutral and, once engaged in forward or reverse, the drum will continue to rotate until the lever is moved manually. Being a vessel over 15 and less than 150 gross registered tons, the "BERING SEA" was inspected, nominally on a quadrennial basis, by the Ship Safety Branch of the Canadian Coast Guard at Vancouver, B.C., and was in possession of a valid SIC 29 inspection certificate.

On the afternoon of August 14, 1989, while engaged in drumming in the seine, a novice deck-hand operating the hydraulic controls of the drum winch stepped close to the net and attempted to clear the mesh from the floats. Reportedly, the fasteners on the deck-hand's pants chaffed against his chest and made him sore; to alleviate the discomfort, he put the hooks through the slots from the back to front. The hook-type fasteners became entangled in the net and the deck-hand was wound on the drum.

The master working forward of the drum heard a strange noise, looked up and observed the deck-hand being wound on the drum. He ran aft and reversed the rotation of the drum and the deck-hand fell onto the deck.

The crew made him as comfortable as they could and arranged for a MEDEVAC. He was transported to a hospital in Victoria and was treated for fractures to his chest and spine and internal injuries. The deck-hand was released from the hospital and is expected to make a complete recovery.

Findings

On August 14, 1989 in good weather conditions, whilst the net was being hauled aboard the fishing vessel "BERING SEA", a hook-type fastener on the bib of the foul weather gear worn by the novice deck-hand became caught in the net and he was wound around the drum.

It would appear that the following factors contributed to the accident:

- to alleviate the discomfort caused by the chaffing of the hook on the wearer's chest resulting from the design of the hook-type fastener, the deck-hand pushed the

"BERING SEA"

Section réduite de la
carte N° 3001 du SHC

Reduced section of CHS
chart No 3001

Profondeurs en brasses

Depths in fathoms

Position of
accident

Position de
l'accident

CAUTION A
For Traffic Separation Scheme and
Exercise Areas in Juan De Fuca Strait
see Chart 3808

BRITISH
COLUMBIA

VANCOUVER
VICTORIA

JUAN DE FUCA STRAIT

CANADA
UNITED STATES

fastener through the slot from back to front thereby exposing the hooks, enabling one to catch in the mesh of the net;

- lacking experience, the deck-hand did not fully appreciate the hazards associated with fishing operations; and
- the deck-hand did not follow the master's instructions to keep away from the net and to 'roll the head-rope' to keep the floats clear.

Other Findings

The master was neither in possession of a Certificate of Competency to operate a fishing vessel of this size nor was he in possession of a RORC (Maritime).

The drum winch controls were not of the 'dead-man' type nor is there any regulatory requirement for the controls to be designed to operate in that manner.

The deck-hand called out for help but because of the engine noise was only faintly heard by the master.

"HESQUIAT"/"PRIDE AND JOY"
Collision Grenville Channel, B.C., August 18, 1989

Summary

"HESQUIAT"

The 167 gross ton, 31.7m Canadian fish packer "HESQUIAT" was enroute to Prince Rupert with a crew of 6 and some 120 tonnes of salmon on board. She was on auto-pilot, northbound in Grenville Channel at a speed of about 10 knots; the mate was at the con and an engineer was maintaining a look-out. Upon passing Tom Island light, the engineer proceeded to the engine-room and a short time later the vessel entered a fog bank; visibility was reduced to 90m and appropriate fog signals were reportedly sounded.


Some 7 minutes prior to collision, a radar target of a vessel, later identified to be the "PRIDE & JOY", was observed some 2 miles ahead and heading in a S'yly direction. The vessel was switched to hand steering and a small course alteration to starboard was carried out. When a green sidelight became faintly visible about 20° on the port bow, her speed was reduced and reverse propulsion was engaged, but this action was too late and both vessels collided. She sustained minor damage and repairs were estimated to cost \$10,000.

"PRIDE & JOY"

The 14.9 gross ton, 11.83m Canadian troller "PRIDE & JOY" was enroute to fishing grounds off Cape Cook, B.C. with a crew of 3. The vessel, southbound at a speed of 7 knots, was favouring the north side of Grenville Channel; the deck-hand was alone on the bridge. Some 3 minutes prior to collision, a vessel, later identified to be the "HESQUIAT", appeared on the radar display very fine to starboard of the heading marker about 1 mile away. The deck-hand made a series of small course alterations to port without establishing VHF R/T contact. When both vessels were close, the helm was applied hard to port. She made a complete circle before striking the "HESQUIAT" on the port side forward of amidships. Immediately prior to collision, the engine speed was reduced and reverse propulsion was engaged. She sustained heavy damage, was initially abandoned and later salvaged. The estimated replacement cost was about \$200,000. All 3 crew members were rescued by the "HESQUIAT".

Findings

On August 18, 1989, the small Canadian fishing vessel "PRIDE & JOY" and the large Canadian packer "HESQUIAT" were involved in a collision in fog and darkness due to both vessels not complying with certain provisions of the Collision Regulations.



It would appear that the collision occurred due to the following contributing factors:

Both Vessels

- made no attempt to utilize the VHF R/T to ascertain the intentions of the other;
- persons in charge of the watch did not have any formal training in the operation of radar and were alone in the wheel-house performing the duties of a navigator, helmsman and look-out;
- did not reduce speed or engage reverse propulsion until it was too late; and
- persons in charge of the watch did not appreciate that a potentially dangerous situation was developing and did not notify the operator/master in adequate time to assess the situation;

"PRIDE & JOY"

- deck-hand made a series of small course alterations to port, based on scanty radar information; and
- deck-hand became disoriented in fog and darkness and made a complete circle before striking the "HESQUIAT" on her port side;

"HESQUIAT"

- without having arranged a safe passage and without having sighted the "PRIDE & JOY" visually made a small alteration of course to starboard based on scanty radar information.

Other Findings

The "PRIDE & JOY" stayed afloat for some time after the collision occurred, enabling a successful rescue of survivors.

The "PRIDE & JOY" did not carry sufficient lifejackets for the complement carried.

The "PRIDE & JOY" transmitted a "MAYDAY" on channel 78 instead of channel 16 and did not receive a response.

"DALEWOOD PROVIDER"

Capsize, Juan de Fuca Strait, B.C., August 17, 1989.

Summary

The 39 gross ton, 16.46 m long, aluminum seiner "DALEWOOD PROVIDER" had undergone extensive modifications, over a period of 11 years including extension of the stern and shortening of the bow; the latter to meet Pacific Fisheries Regulations. She was in possession of a Steamship Inspection Certificate due to expire on April 20, 1990. The vessel fished out of Anniesville Slough, Vancouver, B.C.

After 3 days of fishing, the two forward hold tanks were full and the catch was now being loaded in the aft hold tank; the latter extending the full width of the vessel and separated by penboards. At 1900, August 17, 1989, the salmon opening was closed. The vessel, by now, heavily laden with slack fuel and fresh water tanks, with booms topped and main hatch covers in place but not secured, departed fishing grounds for Vancouver. The vessel was on auto-pilot, proceeding at a speed of about 8 knots and at about 2000, some water was observed on deck at the stern. The weather was calm, no waves and the visibility was reduced in fog. Suddenly, for no apparent reason, the rudder went hard-to-port in response to the automatic pilot. The vessel began heeling to starboard and in one continuous motion rolled over until completely capsized within 30 seconds; meanwhile, the crew escaped through the port side deck-house door without lifejackets, launched and boarded the inflatable liferaft. Some 15-20 minutes later, the survivors were rescued by a passing fishing vessel and taken to Vancouver. The vessel remained afloat in the overturned position, was subsequently salvaged, repaired at a cost of about \$300,000 and returned to service.

Findings

The "DALEWOOD PROVIDER" capsized to starboard and remained afloat in relatively calm weather at about 2130, August 17, 1989, when in a position off Jordan River in the Juan de Fuca Strait, B.C. It would appear that the following factors contributed to the capsize:


- the vessel was heavily loaded and trimmed by the stern, with intact transverse stability characteristics significantly lower than the minimum regulatory requirements;
- the free surface effect of water reportedly entrapped at the after end of the working deck shortly before the capsize, drastically reduced the vessel's already low initial and dynamic stability;

"DALEWOOD PROVIDER"

Outline General Arrangement
(At the time of casualty)

"DALEWOOD PROVIDER"

Plan d'ensemble
(Au moment du sinistre)



1. 15'0" Seine Skiff on deck
2. Aft fuel tank 50%
3. Water washing on deck
4. Fresh water tank 75%
5. Seine net on reel

6. Aft Hold load 50%
7. Hole on the lining hold
8. Ship Boom topped up
9. Forward Hold load 100%
10. Forward fuel tank 75%



"HARBOUR PROVIDER" -
sister ship of
"DALEWOOD PROVIDER".

"HARBOUR PROVIDER" -
navire jumeau du
"DALEWOOD PROVIDER".



"DALEWOOD PROVIDER"
in the capsized state
at Esquimalt.

Le "DALE PROVIDER"
chaviré à Esquimalt.

S L - 26 -
A N D



San Juan Ridge

Jordan Ridge

APPROXIMATE
CAPSIZE
POSITION

LIEU
APPROXIMATIF
DU CHAVIREMENT

WH

"DALEWOOD PROVIDER"

SECTION OF CHS SECTION DE LA CARTE
CHART No. L/C 3606 No. L/C 3606 DU SHC

DEPTHS IN METRES PROFONDEURS EN METRES



- the sudden unaccountable action of the auto-pilot which put the rudder hard-a-port while the vessel was steaming at approximately 8 knots;
- the centrifugal forces generated during the abrupt change of course which caused the vessel to heel to starboard; and
- the concurrent rapid gravitation of loose liquids and fish catch to starboard created dynamic heeling moments which overcame the vessel's limited righting ability.

Other Findings

Modifications carried out to the vessel over the years raised the vessel's centre of gravity and, although subject to Coast Guard and insurance inspection during that time, the transverse stability was not re-assessed.

Recently, extensive modifications were made to the stern and then, at the instigation of F & O, to the bow, without reference to Coast Guard.

"MIDNIGHT ROCKERS"

**Injury to a crew member, Georges Bank, N.S.,
September 19, 1989.**

Summary

The "MIDNIGHT ROCKERS", a 33 gross ton Canadian fishing vessel was stopped in the water and rolling easily near Georges Bank, N.S. At about 1800, September 19, 1989, she was approached by a 14 gross ton Canadian fishing vessel "R.E.S. III" whose operator indicated that he wished to talk to a deck-hand. The deck-hand, without informing the skipper and without wearing a PFD, left the shelter of the after deck and made his way to stand on the exposed fore deck on the port side of the wheel-house.

When the starboard bow of "R.E.S. III" came within reach, the deck-hand attempted to fend it off and in the process lost his footing and his upper body was crushed between the vessels. Fortunately, he did not fall into the water. CGRS was advised and RCC Halifax alerted, thus initiating official SAR response. Attempts at MEDEVAC using a DFO helicopter were unsuccessful, mainly due to fog and failing daylight. The deck-hand having sustained severe body injuries was subsequently brought ashore by a DFO vessel, some 19 hours after the accident resulting in some local criticism of SAR operations. The injured deck-hand, taken to a hospital, has since been undergoing medical treatment.


Findings

As the "MIDNIGHT ROCKERS", stopped in the water and rolling easily, was approached by "R.E.S. III" for the purpose of conversation, a crew member aboard the "MIDNIGHT ROCKERS" attempted to fend off the bow of "R.E.S. III" and in the process was crushed between the vessels sustaining severe injuries.

It would appear that the following factors contributed to the injuries sustained by one of "MIDNIGHT ROCKERS" crew:

- the deck-hand left the comparative safety of the after deck for the exposed fore deck, and the skipper raised no objections;
- seeing the "R.E.S. III" approaching, and instead of keeping clear, the deck-hand attempted to fend off the other vessel;
- at a critical moment, the deck-hand lost his balance and fell, at which time his torso was crushed between the two vessels;
- the fore deck of "MIDNIGHT ROCKERS", of a 'non-slip' design, had received no recent treatment to preserve the

NOVA



Chart/ Carte 4012

LAHAVE BANK

BACCARD BANK

66° 00' W

SHELBURNE - 95 M

BROWNS BANK

"MIDNIGHT ROCKERS"

SECTION DE LA CARTE
NO. L/C 4003 DU SHC

SECTION OF CHS CHART
NO. L/C 4003

PROFONDEURS EN
BRASSES

DEPTHS IN FATHOMS

POSITION OF INCIDENT
POSITION DE L'ACCIDENT

Chart/ Carte 8006

42° 00 N

NOTE - All positions and times are approximate
NOTA - Toutes les positions et les heures sont approximatives

FISHING ZONE 4

ZONE DE PÊCHE 4



"R.E.S. III" (Outboard).
 "R.E.S. III" (À l'extérieur).



"MIDNIGHT ROCKERS" -
 port side forward
 showing possible position
 of deck-hand.

Vue de l'avant
 du côté bâbord
 montrant l'endroit où
 il est possible que
 le matelot se soit
 trouvé.

original abrasive surface; and

- the owner/operator of "R.E.S. III" did not stop his vessel in sufficient time to maintain a safe distance between the two vessels.

It would appear that the following factors contributed to the delay in evacuating the injured crew member:

- the DFO helicopter pilot and crew attempted to render assistance in weather conditions that were not conducive to a safe MEDEVAC;
- the DFO helicopter pilot decided to abort the mission only after the risk to his crew became unacceptable and a diminishing fuel supply was considered;
- flying time from a base in P.E.I., the need to refuel at Yarmouth and a reduction in visibility below the safe flying limits prevented further SAR helicopter use; and
- F.P.V. "LOUISBURG", as the only viable alternative to a helicopter rescue in dense fog, made a rendezvous with "MIDNIGHT ROCKERS" and successfully transported the injured man to Shelburne, N.S.

Other Findings

The skipper and crew of "MIDNIGHT ROCKERS" had minimal first aid knowledge.

"MIDNIGHT ROCKERS" made no attempt to head for port after the initial MEDEVAC by the DFO helicopter failed.

The various agencies involved acted with professionalism but were frustrated in their efforts by the inherent safety problems of flying helicopters in fog conditions.


The DFO helicopter had held no SAR training exercises with SAR units.

The "MIDNIGHT ROCKERS" was fishing in an area beyond the limits set out in her inspection certificate.

It was fortunate that despite being crushed, the injured deck-hand did not relinquish his hand hold as he was not wearing a PFD.

The radio station aboard the "R.E.S. III" was not licensed.

None of the operator/skipper aboard the "R.E.S. II" or the "MIDNIGHT ROCKERS" was in possession of a RORC.



"NATURAL GIFT"

Operator lost overboard, Johnstone Strait, B.C.,
August 21, 1989.

Summary

The 13 gross ton, 12.8 m long "NATURAL GIFT" is a gillnetter/-troller of closed construction with her general arrangement as shown in figure 1. A number of hazards on the after deck including rises and stepdowns require that a person moving around in that area be sure-footed and agile; more so, as in this instance, when the deck was not completely dry. The bulwarks on the after deck varied in height from 68.5 cm abreast of the main hatchway to 12 cm in way of the raised deck at the after end. The view from the steering position is restricted such that the starboard quarter, transom area and all of the port side of the main deck are out of sight.

The vessel, with a catch of some 2461 kg of iced salmon and a crew of 2 comprising the operator and his wife, was transiting in Johnstone Strait, B.C., August 21, 1989; the weather was good and the seas calm. At 1415, the wife took over the steering and the operator proceeded on deck to clear away and clean the previous night's fishing gear and remaining catch. He wore seasonal clothing and thigh length rubber boots with tops turned down below the knees but did not wear any form of PFD.


At about 1440, not being able to see the operator from the steering position in the wheel-house, the wife went on deck where, having called out and searched the vessel, realised he was no longer on board. The vessel was slowed down, search commenced and CGRS alerted thus setting in motion official SAR response. An extensive search of the area ensued with negative results and the case was handed over to the RCMP as a 'missing person' case.

Findings

At sometime between 1420 and 1440, August 21, 1989, the operator of the Canadian small fishing vessel "NATURAL GIFT" was lost overboard in clear calm weather, in the vicinity of Camp Point, B.C. while southbound in Johnstone Strait.

In the absence of any eye-witnesses, the precise time, location or cause of his loss overboard are not known, but it would appear that the following factors may have contributed to the accident:

- while washing the deck and clearing fish debris when underway, the operator routinely used a deck broom, bucket and a liquid detergent, during which footing on deck could become treacherous;



"NATURAL GIFT"

SECTION DE LA CARTE
NO. 3595 DU SHC

SECTION OF CHS CHART
NO. 3595

PROFONDEURS EN
BRASSES

DEPTHS IN FATHOMS

BRITISH

COLUMBIA

VANCOUVER
ISLAND
VICTORIA

CAUTION
For the Traffic Separation Scheme for
Race and Current Passages use Chart
3544

Most likely area of M.O.B.
Secteur tres probable où la
victime est passé par-dessus
bord.

14:20

NOTE - All courses and positions are approximate

NOTA - Toutes les routes et positions sont approximatives

PRINCE OF WALES RANGE

- the working area on the small fishing vessel, particularly near the stern, is congested with fishing gear, nets, and fish pens, and requires a person to be agile and sure-footed;
- the bulwark across the transom in way of the raised deck aft is only 125 mm (5") high, and provides little security while climbing into or out of the fishing cockpit;
- the after deck, particularly the cockpit and port side are not visible from the steering position; and
- the noise emanating from the main engine may probably have prevented any call for help from being heard in the wheel-house.

It would appear that, having been lost overboard, the following factors contributed to the loss of the operator's life:

- strong and confused currents regularly occur in the immediate area where the operator fell overboard;
- the cold water temperature limited his survival time to between 2-2½ hours had he been able to remain afloat;
- because of the fair weather he did not wear any of the flotation devices onboard the vessel, thereby further reducing his survival time; and
- although a strong swimmer, he would initially have been handicapped by the thigh length rubber boots which were turned down below his knees.

Other Findings

Despite preoccupation handling and manoeuvring the vessel single-handed and also broadcasting the "MAYDAY" message, the initial search in the immediate area of the casualty by the "NATURAL GIFT", although unsuccessful, was prompt.

Had some form of marine designed thermal work suit or immersion suit been worn by the operator, his chances of survival would have been increased.

"SOU'WEST MARINER"

Flooding and total loss off East Coast of Nova Scotia,

September 30, 1989

Summary

The 7 year old, 82 gross ton, 18.23m Canadian wooden inshore trawler "SOU'WEST MARINER" was fitted with 3 transverse bulkheads into 4 compartments, namely, from forward, accommodation, engine-room, fish hold and lazaret. After a catch of some 9,000 kg of cod and haddock, the vessel departed the fishing grounds on September 29, 1989, with a crew of 3, bound for Halifax. At 2000, after 8 hours of uneventful progress at a speed of some 10 knots in the prevailing moderate/rough weather conditions, the engine-room high water alarm sounded in the wheel-house. The skipper, alone in the wheel-house, placed the engine in neutral and alerted the other crew. Investigation by the skipper revealed that there was about 1m of water in the engine-room and that water had also entered the fish hold and lazaret.

Despite using all 3 vessel's pumps to capacity, the water level continued to rise until, at 2200, it covered the batteries and electrical circuits, causing the pumps to stop. In response to a call for assistance, 2 pumps were air-dropped of which one was retrieved. After 85 minutes of unsuccessful attempts to start the pump, the crew abandoned the vessel into an inflatable liferaft at about 0100 September 30, 1989; the vessel, by then, was awash to the level of the after deck. All crew members were rescued at 0125 and transported to Port Bickerton, N.S. at 0758 by the Coast Guard lifeboat "BICKERTON".

The vessel, with an estimated value of \$500,000, sank some 4 hours later in 90 fathoms of water and is considered a total loss.


Findings

The Canadian inshore fishing vessel "SOU'WEST MARINER" flooded and sank in moderate to rough sea conditions while loaded to part capacity with a catch of fish. Whilst the precise cause of flooding could not be determined, it would appear that the vessel flooded and sank due to the following:

- a hull plank on this 7 year old vessel sprang, causing the plank seams to open;
- the seams progressively opened, allowing increasing ingress of seawater to the hull;

NOU

- 37 -



Direction to Vers
Halifax Halifax

Position of Position du
sinking naufrage

"SOU'WEST MARINER"

Section réduite de la Reduced section of CHS
carte N° 4013 du SHC chart No 4013

Profondeurs en brasses Depths in fathoms

- the transverse bulkheads allowed through flooding of the hull, and/or the source of leak extended to more than one compartment;
- the vessel's pumping systems were unable to contain the increasing ingress;
- the crew was unable to start the SAR, air-dropped pump; and
- the crew was suffering from stress and fatigue.

Other Findings

The starting instructions contained with the SAR air-dropped pump were confusing.

The protective packaging of the gasoline cans in this instance did not withstand the air-drop impact.

Gasoline vapours within the canister presented danger upon opening and the removal of the contents.

The flashlight in the canister was inoperative.

"MARITIMER"

Fire and total loss, near Virgin Rocks, Nfld,
October 21, 1989.

Summary

The 72 gross ton, 18.28 m wooden Canadian fishing vessel "MARITIMER" was built in 1968 at Shelburne, N.S. The hull was subdivided into 4 compartments comprising from forward the accommodation, engine-room, fish hold and lazaret. She was last inspected in 1987 and, having complied with regulatory requirements, was issued SIC 29 certificate expiring in October 1991. She was classed Home Trade II restricted to voyages not more than 60 miles offshore. The vessel was equipped with a space heater and the numeric plate showing fuel control setting on it had been obliterated.



The "MARITIMER", with a total catch of some 20,000 kg of fish, departed from her fishing grounds some 90 miles east of Cape Race with 9 POB bound for St. John's, Nfld. At about 1100, October 21, 1989, some 15 minutes into the voyage, the skipper who was at the helm smelled smoke and informed the chief engineer/mate, who was on the afterdeck, to investigate.

He entered the forecabin/accommodation space which was lightly filled with smoke and managed to shut off the carburetor controlling the oil flow to the space heater unit situated on the port side near the bulkhead separating the accommodation/engine-room spaces. There was no flame evident at the time but he was forced to exit the space due to the smoke. He was directed to keep watch and was handed a fire extinguisher. As he tried to remove the pin to trigger the unit, the forecabin space burst into flame. Smoke filled the wheel-house and both were forced to leave before any action to discharge the extinguisher could be taken. Upon instructions from the skipper, the inflatable liferaft was launched. The skipper managed to broadcast a message for assistance on VHF R/T channel 6 to 3 other fishing vessels known to be fishing some 1.5 miles away. The crew, without wearing lifejackets, abandoned the vessel into the liferaft and were rescued shortly thereafter. The weather at the time of the casualty was clear skies, light seas with no wind and 10 miles visibility.

The vessel burnt to the waterline and sank representing a loss estimated at \$550,000. There was no injury and no pollution was reported.

Findings

Shortly after commencing her return voyage from the fishing grounds near the Virgin Rocks, Nfld., in good weather conditions, a fire which was associated with an oil heating stove broke out in



ND/TERRE-NEUVE

COURANT LABRADOR
LABRADOR CURRENT
Inshore Branch
Compensated Current
(10 kts)

POSITION OF "MARITIMER"
POSITION DU "MARITIMER"

THE GRAND BANKS OF NEWFOUNDL

"MARITIMER"
SECTION DE LA CARTE NO. 4001 DU SHC
PROFONDEURS EN BRASSES
SECTION OF CHS CHART NO. 4001
DEPTHS IN FATHOMS

the forward accommodation space aboard the Canadian fishing vessel "MARITIMER" resulting in the abandonment of the vessel and her total loss at sea.

The sinking of the vessel precluded her examination and consequently the precise cause of the malfunction of the heating stove cannot be established but, of the options, the most likely causes were:

- the obliterated markings on the numeric plate showing fuel control settings could permit the unit to be inadvertently maladjusted, possibly resulting in its overheating;
- although turned off when found to be smoking, the flow of fuel to the heating unit may have continued due to a defect in the carburetor;
- fuel in the carburetor vaporized and ignited due to high temperature within the already overheated unit; and
- the space was very dry having been heated continuously for 5 days.

Other Findings

The "MARITIMER" initiated and transmitted a message for assistance on channel 6 instead of channel 16 VHF R/T, the designated International Distress Safety Calling frequency.

The vessel was fishing in an area outside the limits of her Inspection Certificate.

The vessel did not carry a lifeboat as required by the Lifesaving Equipment Regulations, and her liferaft was overdue for servicing.

"ANGO"

**Loss overboard of a crew member, Davis Strait,
November 11/12, 1989.**

Summary

The Faroese registered, 1169 gross ton factory freezer/stern trawler "ANGO" was involved in a joint venture with Nova Scotian and Newfoundland fishing companies and carried a crew of 15 Faroese, 10 Canadians and one Japanese technician/overseer. After discharging her catch at Godthaab (NUUK) Greenland, she returned to her Canadian fishing grounds, area 'OB', in Davis Strait on November 6, 1989 and continued fishing.

By November 11, 1989 some 50 tons of shrimp had been taken on board and processed. About 2030, while the net was being towed in approximate position 68°18'N, 59°20'W, a Canadian crew member Mr. Hearn who was working on the processing line became ill and complained of stomach cramps. He advised his co-worker on the processing line and left the work area but did not indicate where he was going or whatever assistance, if any, he might seek.

Shortly after 2345 the co-worker, upon finishing his shift, went to the galley for coffee. Upon learning that Mr. Hearn was not seen by other crew members since 2030, he became concerned. After completing a search of the vessel and finding no trace of Mr. Hearn, the master was notified at 0015, November 12. The fishing gear was retrieved, Canadian and Faroese authorities informed and immediate search for the victim commenced by the vessel. Ten other fishing vessels also joined in the search.

Weather conditions on November 11 and 12, 1989 were SE winds 35-45 knots; 5-7 m seas; poor visibility in rain sleet and snow; surface sea temperature +1°C to -1.3°C. A film of ice was reported on the vessel's decks. By 1330, November 12, the worsening weather and sea conditions necessitated that the search be called off. The case was then handed over to the RCMP as a missing person case.

A continuing watch was maintained by vessels fishing in the area until on November 21, 1989 when a body identified as Mr. Hearn was taken on board the Faroese fishing vessel "FAROE PRAWN" in her shrimp net in position Latitude 64°18'N, 59°20'W.

The body was transferred to the "ANGO" and subsequently airlifted to St. John's, Nfld. An autopsy revealed the cause of death to be drowning.

Findings

While the vessel was fishing in the Davis Strait area in moderate to rough weather conditions, Mr William Hearn had become

POSITION OF INCIDENT
POSITION DE L'ACCIDENT



"ANGLO"

SECTION DE LA CARTE
NO. 7000 DU SHC

SECTION OF CHS CHART
NO. 7000

PROFONDEURS EN
BRASSES

DEPTHS IN FATHOMS

Adjoining Chart 5001

55°

ill from an unknown cause during the performance of his duties in the factory aboard the Faroese shrimp trawler "ANGO". He departed the space at 2030, November 11, 1989 when he was last seen alive.

In the absence of any eyewitness it is not possible to determine the precise cause of his disappearance but of the options, it would appear that having gone out on the icy deck for fresh air, either he leaned on or over the shipside rail/bulwark or he was in the process of vomiting at the ship's side when he accidentally lost his footing and fell overboard.

Having fallen overboard, his chances of survival would have been slim due to the following contributing factors:

- noise emanating from the vessel may have prevented any calls for help from being heard;
- there was a lapse of some three to three and one half hours before he was discovered missing; and
- the cold water temperature and prevailing weather conditions substantially limited his survival time particularly as he was wearing light clothing.

Glossary

Beaching	Intentionally putting a vessel (partly) ashore for the purpose of cleaning or repairing the hull or preventing its sinking in deep water
CCG	Canadian Coast Guard
CCGC	Canadian Coast Guard Cutter
CCGS	Canadian Coast Guard Ship
CGRS	Coast Guard Radio Station
CMRA	Canadian Marine Rescue Auxiliary
Cable	One tenth of a nautical mile
ETA	Estimated time of arrival
FPV	Fisheries Patrol Vessel
FV	Fishing Vessel
Fish Packers	Fishing vessels being used only for transportation of fish
Free surface effect	Whenever there is a surface of liquid which is free to move, there is a loss of effective GM due to a virtual rise of the vessel's centre of gravity and the loss of stability caused by the movement of liquid in partially filled compartments when the vessel rolls. This movement may involve a large shift of weight.
Freeboard	The distance between the waterline and the upper edge of the weather deck.
(G)	Gyro
GM	The distance between the transverse metacentre and the vertical centre of gravity, and is an indication of a vessel's ability to right herself when heeled over.

Limber holes	Holes in the lower part of vertical plates for drainage purposes
M	Magnetic
MRSC	Marine Rescue Sub-Centre
MAYDAY	Distress signal
MEDEVAC	The urgent evacuation of a person from a vessel for medical reasons
PAN	Prefix to urgency message
Port of refuge	A reasonably safe place of retreat from winds or storms
r.p.m.	Revolutions per minute
RCC	Rescue Co-ordination Centre
SAR	Search and Rescue
SFV	Small fishing vessel
SIC	Steamship Inspection Certificate
SSB	Single sideband radio
T	True
Traffic separation scheme	Routeing system designed to avoid marine collisions
Trim	The difference between the draught forward and aft
USCG	United States Coast Guard
VHF	Very high frequency radio